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International Networks and Human Rights in Indonesia 
Michele Ford 
Discussions of human rights in Indonesia tend to emphasise either their abrogation in regard 
to particular events and circumstances or the local mechanisms through which an aspect of 
the international human rights regime is (or is not) implemented. There is a vast and detailed 
academic and activist literature on the former, providing rich accounts of human rights abuses 
and local struggles for human rights change. Within the more limited literature on the latter, 
critics argue that a human rights infrastructure has been developed in response to 
international pressure with no real intention of addressing ongoing human rights abuses (see, 
for example, Juwana, 2003; Linton, 2006). More sympathetic accounts assert that, while far 
from perfect, current human rights mechanisms reflect a genuine and incremental attempt to 
respond to the demands of citizens, local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the 
international community, and improve Indonesia's human rights record (see, for example, 
Eldridge, 2002). 
What is missing from this literature is any serious attention to the impact that tensions and 
inconsistencies within the international rights lobby itself has on rights change at the local 
level. Scholars have long wrestled with questions regarding the extent to which international 
norms and covenants and bilateral pressure influence local human rights practice and the 
mechanisms through which such transformations occur (for example, Donnelly, 1986; 
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Vreeland, 2008). It is clear, however, as Risse and Sikkink 
(1999) have argued, that a crucial factor in the diffusion of international human rights norms 
is the establishment of effective links between transnational activist networks and their local 
counterparts. Transnational actors can draw international attention to rights-violating 
behaviour and empower local human rights activists, thus bringing pressure to bear 
simultaneously from above and below. Such alliances help to explain the existence of a series 
of distinct, and yet mutable and overlapping, communities within the human rights lobby, 
which at times coincide with particular segments of national political economy or of society, 
but at others with a particular view of what form rights change should take. The effectiveness 
of these different coalitions is clearly constrained by broader trends towards greater or lesser 
observance of human rights in particular national contexts- in its most dramatic form when 
regimes change, but also with the ebb and flow of political space within a particular regime. 
At the same time, however, the human rights field, or 'sector', in which each coalition is 
situated has its own dynamics stemming from the interaction between the particular 
international actors concerned with rights change in that sector and sector-specific 
constellations of interest and power within a particular national setting. It is therefore 
necessary in any assessment of human rights change to identify the transnationally 
constituted drivers of change with regard to different kinds of right. 
Given the complexity of both international and local political structures and constellations, as 
well as competition between coalitions of interest, it is no easy task to map the contingent and 
often shadowy distinctions between different rights fields. It is nonetheless to the intersection 
between these sectoral dynamics and regimes that we must turn if we are to understand 
changes in the local political context of human rights, the depth of foreign donor influence 
and agendas on the terrain of human rights activism, and the degree to which activists drive 
rights change in particular contexts. Following Risse and Sikkink, I privilege the point of 
interaction between local and international campaigns for better access to human rights in my 
analysis of the socialisation of human rights norms and the establishment of human rights 
institutions, but in a way that contextualises those interactions within the political context of 
Indonesia. I begin my attempt to do so with an overview of the shifts in the political terrain in 
the decades immediately before and after the fall of Suharto's authoritarian New Order 
regime in May 1998, with a view to charting the impact of those shifts on the observance of 
human rights. I then turn my attention to three particular sectors within human rights 
advocacy- namely labour rights, women's rights and the right to political self-determination - 
in order to describe their quite different trajectories, before returning to the broader 
implications of this analysis for our understanding both of human rights in Indonesia and of 
human rights change itself. 
Turning points 
International attempts to improve human rights practice in Indonesia - and local responses to 
them - have waxed and waned since Suharto's New Order came to power in the mid-sixties. 
The New Order regime was itself born of a human rights atrocity in the form of the bloody 
events that followed the aborted Communist coup of 30 September 1965, after which 
between 500 000 and 1 000 000 Indonesians were massacred.1 Political and civil rights were 
systematically repressed by the authoritarian corporatist regime (compare Stepan, 1978), 
which argued not only that such rights were meaningless in the absence of economic 
development, but that their exercise was socially irresponsible because it threatened the order 
and stability necessary for the achievement of economic growth. At the same time, although 
the living standards of most Indonesians did greatly improve, the gap between rich and poor 
continued to grow and the economic rights of many individuals were sacrificed to large 
development projects as farmers and villagers lost their land through forced reclamation to 
factories, resorts, elite housing developments and even golf courses. Indonesians' access to 
their cultural and social rights was also limited as the regime imposed a national culture and 
code of behaviour based on the traditions of Central Java and sought to eliminate a whole 
range of ' backward' and 'godless’ cultural practices, from the diffuse family structures of the 
Asmat in Papua, to the itinerant lifestyle of nomads involved in swidden agriculture and sea 
people (orang laut), to Confucianism and atheism. 
The place of human rights within the political rhetoric and practice of New Order Indonesia 
must be understood within the international context of its time. President Suharto rose to 
power at the height of the Cold War, when Southeast Asia represented a key battleground in 
the superpowers' struggle for influence. As a result, the US and its allies were prepared to 
provide aid to Indonesia irrespective of the regime's human rights record. US officials 
reported approvingly of the killing of Communists in 1965- 66 (Simpson, 2008), and the 
governments of the US and Australia tacitly supported the invasion of East Timor a decade 
later (Westad, 2005; Cotton, 2004). In the course of its 32-year rule, the regime engaged with 
impunity in other very visible violations of political and civil rights, such as the crushing of 
student protesters in 1974 in what became known as the 15 January Calamity (Malapetaka 15 
Januari, Malari), the 'mysterious killings' (Penembakan Misterius, Petrus) of the early to 
mid-1980s and the brutal suppression of separatist movements in Papua and Aceh. 
Like the rest of Southeast Asia, Indonesia was deeply affected by the change in policy of the 
US and its allies towards the non-communist authoritarian regimes with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. As the threat of Communism receded, there were no longer such pressing reasons to 
ignore reports of human rights abuses in the region, and Suharto's government came under 
increasing pressure to improve its human rights record, especially with regard to civil and 
political rights. International criticisms of the regime grew stronger after the events of 12 
November 1991, when hundreds of protesters were shot during a memorial ceremony in the 
Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. A film made of the shootings by Max Stahl, one of a number of 
journalists in East Timor for a cancelled visit of Portuguese dignitaries, was smuggled out of 
East Timor, sparking a strong international response to the incident, including the suspension 
of some aid programs (Cotton, 2004). In the wake of the incident, pressure for improvements 
in Indonesia's human rights record increased markedly, leading to a range of internationally 
sponsored measures to redress human rights concerns, including the establishment of 
indonesia's National Human Rights Commission (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, 
Komnas HAM) in 1993. 
In Indonesia itself this intensified international scrutiny, along with growing domestic unrest, 
prompted the government to declare in 1989 a period of openness (keterbukaan) modelled on 
Gorbachev's glasnost. Student protests had occurred at a number of points earlier in the New 
Order - most notably during the early 1970s and in the months leading up to the 1977 
elections and into 1978 (Aspinall, 2005) - before campus activism was effectively 
marginalised when the military occupied universities and independent student councils were 
abolished (Budiman, 1981). However, many of those engaged in the resurgence of student 
activism in the 1990s had their first experience of organised dissent in the Kedung Ombo 
case in 1991, when thousands of people were displaced to make way for a dam funded by, 
amongst others, the World Bank (Stanley, 1994). These student activists - many of whom 
went on to work in human rights NGOs -constituted the vanguard in a wave of middle-class 
activism a round human rights in the 1990s, with campaigns for the rights of workers, women 
and the urban poor, and on rights abuses associated with access to land and degradation of the 
environment. 
The student and NGO campaigns of the 1990s were situated within a broader oppositional 
movement, which was increasingly vocal in its demands for democracy. The absolute 
dominance of the regime's political vehicle, Golkar, was challenged for the first time when, in 
1993 against the express wishes of President Suharto, the daughter of Indonesia's first 
president, Sukarno, and popular candidate, Megawati Soekarnoputri, was chosen as chair of 
the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), one of the two parties 
permitted in addition to Golkar from the early 1970s (Liddle, 1997). Megawati's PDI went on 
to become the nucleus of a broad opposition movement, which included well-known Muslim 
figure and democrat Abdurrahman Wahid, independent trade union leader Muchtar Pakpahan 
and the People's Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, PRD), the party established 
by the leftist student groups that also founded the Indonesian Centre for Labour Struggle 
(Puscat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia, PPBI) and the student network, Indonesian Students in 
Solidarity for Democracy (Solidarilas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi, SMID), and 
which adopted an explicitly Marxist platform. 
The first major signal that the expansion of political and civil rights experienced under 
keterbukaan was over was the closure of three news magazines in June 1994, an event that 
prompted widespread protests and led to the establishment of the Alliance of Independent 
Journalists (Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, AJI) (Heryanto and Stanley, 2002). The remnants of 
the policy of openness were then resoundingly dispelled with the so-called 27 July Affair of 
1996, when the headquarters of Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) were stormed, pro-democracy activists arrested 
and several PRD leaders imprisoned (see Jakarta Crackdown, 1997). Less than a year later, 
however, the New Order came to an end after Indonesia's currency collapsed in the wake of 
the Asian financial crisis, leading to the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998 and the 
subsequent disintegration of the regime. 
In what came to be known as Reformasi, the authoritarian social structures that constituted 
the hallmark of the New Order were gradually dismantled, the influence of the military 
significantly reduced and the government-controlled three-party system replaced by a multi-
party democracy which, although dominated by existing parties, offered opportunities for 
new political forces to emerge. During the short presidency of Suharto's successor, Habibie, 
many legislative changes were designed to redress past human rights violations and provide 
for the ongoing protection of human rights; most notably, these involved amendments to the 
1945 constitution and included the right of non-retroactivity, the strengthening of Komnas 
HAM and extension of its jurisdiction, the establishment of human rights courts and the 
creation of Komnas Perempuan in 1998 (Herbert, 2008).2 Perhaps most significant among 
these were the Human Rights Law (Law No. 39/1999), which mandated a human rights court 
as well as providing explicit safeguards for a wide range of human rights, and the Press Law 
(Law No.40/ 1999), under which a press council charged with safeguarding press freedom 
was established.3 A number of international conventions were also signed and ratified, 
including the Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and 
the ILO Conventions on forced labour, minimum age of employment, discrimination with 
respect to employment and freedom of association. 
In many areas, shifts in Indonesia's legal framework introduced during Habibie's presidency 
were accompanied by an unprecedented level of substantive change in rights infrastructure 
and governance. In addition to abolishing the draconian Department of Information and 
releasing a number of political prisoners, Habibie's government revoked an anti-subversion 
law that had been in place since 1963, which had been frequently invoked during the New 
Order period. Trade unions rapidly multiplied as ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of 
Association and the Protection of the Right to Organize was enshrined not only in law but in 
policy. The implementation of a policy of widespread economic and political decentralisation 
in 1999, while problematic in other ways, marked another major milestone in improving 
Indonesians' access to their political, cultural and social rights, as local cultures were 
acknowledged and validated (see Aspinall and Fealy, 2003). Habibie also announced the 
termination of Aceh's status as a Military Operation Zone (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM) 
and granted the East Timorese the right of self-determination. While the result of the East 
Timorese referendum was met with bloody repression by the Indonesian military and the 
DOM was later reintroduced in Aceh by President Megawati Soekarnoputri, Habibie's 
decisions on both these matters set in train a chain of events that eventually led to East 
Timor's independence and the cessation of the long and bloody separatist conflict in Aceh. 
Further advances in Indonesia's human rights framework were achieved during the 
presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, when a Department of Human Rights was established, 
and significant steps were taken towards the abolition of systemic discrimination against 
Indonesia's Chinese minority. In addition, democratisation meant that topics that were far too 
sensitive to pursue inside Indonesia during the Suharto years - for example, the killings of 
1965-66 and the treatment of political prisoners - have made their way onto the domestic 
human rights agenda (Cribb and Ford, 2010). 
This is not to suggest that human rights abuses no longer occur in Indonesia. In the post-
Suharto period, the ongoing influence of New Order power-brokers within the political elite 
(see Robison and Hadiz, 2004) continue to represent a significant barrier to human rights 
change. In addition, as many commentators have noted, there remain numerous bureaucratic 
and other structural barriers to substantive improvements with regard to human rights. 
Despite massive international investment in technical support and capacity-building, human 
rights mechanisms are still very fragile because of corruption, structural weaknesses in the 
new human rights institutions, a lack of government infrastructure at the grassroots and the 
vagaries of the political system. As a result, legal-structural advances have not always 
translated fully at the grassroots. For instance, Amnesty International (2007) reports that, 
although the government banned doctors and nurses from performing female circumcision, 
this has not been enforced. In another example, Purdey (2002) has argued that the Joint Fact 
Finding Team established to investigate the anti-Chinese riots that occurred in the May 1998 
violence failed to find the perpetrators of the violence, or to protect the victims from ongoing 
harm. 
A final factor that scholars identify as having a potential impact on civil and political rights in 
Indonesia is the advent of the War on Terror. Not long after the events of 11 September 2001, 
the USA declared Southeast Asia a 'Second Front' in the War against Terror, leading to an 
intensified engagement in the region (Gershman, 2002). According to some observers, the 
need to keep the Indonesian government on side has led to a tempering of international 
pressure regarding human rights. For example, Burgess (2004, p. 139) has argued that 
international demands for fair trials of those accused of human rights violations in East Timor 
have been moderated in an attempt to keep Indonesian authorities on side. While this may 
well be so, at the same time opportunities for joint anti-terrorist actions have been used by 
foreign governments to provide capacity-building for the Indonesian police and military, 
which may promote the professionalisation of these bodies in the medium to long term. 
Furthermore, pressure from the increasingly vocal domestic Islamic lobby has ensured that if 
indeed there has been a deleterious effect on civil and political rights more generally, its 
direct influence has been confined to particular sectors and has exerted a relatively minor 
influence on the growing space for human rights activism. 
Despite these and other ongoing challenges, public space for discussion of human rights and 
the organisational infrastructure through which to expose and challenge human rights 
violations - both official and activist - has nevertheless expanded rapidly since the fall of 
Suharto. It is also evident, however, that within this broad milieu, the promotion of the rights 
agenda within particular rights fields exhibits quite specific sectoral dynamics. 
A sectoral view of rights change  
Even during the New Order there were areas where the regime was more or less disposed to 
accede to international pressure where human rights were concerned. In the labour sphere, for 
example, the regime continued to pay lip service to international principles of trade unionism 
and tripartism even when its repression of independent labour activism was at its height 
(Ford, 2009). Pressure for better access to labour rights increased dramatically when the 
opening up of the Indonesian economy to foreign investment outside the oil and gas sectors 
from the mid-1980s led to a rapid growth of labour-intensive manufacturing for export, 
particularly in garments and footwear. This expansion in light manufacturing brought with it 
intense international scrutiny of labour rights abuses in Indonesian factories along with 
funding for labour NGOs and the threat of trade-based sanctions if labour standards were not 
met (Hadiz, 1997). The 1990s, in particular, saw an intensification of grassroots labour 
activism, as well as middle-class advocacy and organising work on behalf of Indonesia's 
rapidly expanding industrial workforce. And although the regime continued to persecute the 
alternative unions, which constituted a direct challenge to its one-union policy, steady 
pressure from abroad and growing domestic activism succeeded in forcing it to acknowledge 
and tolerate middle-class labour NGOs and the informal workers' groups they sponsored 
(Ford, 2009). 
Successive New Order governments were even more willing to take the steps necessary to be 
seen as a good international citizen with regard to less politicised kinds of rights, such as 
access to certain categories of economic rights (associated with development) and the rights 
of women. Scholars have strongly criticised the regime for maintaining its commitment to 
what Julia Suryakusuma (1996) famously described as 'state ibuism' - an approach that 
framed women's primary purpose to be that of wife and mother. However, campaigns for 
women's rights were in fact relatively uncontroversial under the secular, developmentalist 
New Order state, and international conventions like the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, which Indonesia signed in 1980 and ratified in 
1984, were useful as a means of exerting pressure on successive governments to improve the 
situation for women during the Suharto years. As Katjasungkana (2008) argues, the 
ratification of international conventions then and since has not necessarily led to actual 
implementation of the principles they embody because of the pluralistic nature of the law, 
institutional barriers and a lack of legal resources to support law reform. This important 
caveat notwithstanding, women's rights were considerably easier to promote than many other 
kinds of right under the New Order. 
In certain circumstances, though, the regime was responsive to international pressure even in 
very sensitive areas, such as instances of political repression. For example, as Cardenas 
(2001) has noted, the creation of Komnas HAM in 1993 was very much designed to temper 
international criticisms of Indonesia's human rights record in the aftermath of the Dili 
Massacre of November 1991.4 Although the option of a commission had been discussed 
several months before the massacre, its establishment was announced at a UN-sponsored 
workshop in June 1993 just a week before the World Conference on Human Rights and in the 
wake of threats of sanction by major aid donors. However, responses to calls for self-
determination in separatist regions varied not simply because of differences in the intensity of 
human rights violations but also because international attention - and international 
evaluations of the status of different separatist movements - varied over time and in response 
to particular events. Thus, campaigns against human rights violations in East Timor 
strengthened significantly after documented evidence of the Dili Massacre reached the 
international community, not least because the campaign was taken up by both leftist groups 
and the Catholic Church (Tanter et al., 2001), resulting in some changes at the national level 
and in East Timor itself. By contrast, with human rights abuses occurring in Aceh during the 
drawn-out conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) and 
central government, the region received little attention globally before it was opened up 
following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, since which time Aceh has been a key 
international focus for both humanitarian aid and explicitly rights-based programs (Aspinall, 
2008). 
Within the overarching framework of democratisation, these and other rights sectors have 
continued to move along different trajectories, as the fall of the New Order neither brought a 
completely different pattern of human rights advocacy nor uniformly affected campaigns on 
different kinds of right. Importantly, some areas of serious human rights abuse have remained 
quarantined because of their political sensitivity. It is clear, for example, that in the post-
Suharto period successive Indonesian governments have been far more reluctant to recognise 
rights claims in regions like Aceh and Papua, and also of some groups - for example, the 
isolated tribes (suku terasing) - than of Indonesians generally. The United States Department 
of State (2008) identifies a lack of political will as a contributing factor to the lack of 
accountability for past human rights violations on the part of successive post-Suharto 
governments, while Human Rights Watch (2002) argues that those responsible for human 
rights violations in East Timor have not been prosecuted partly because the Indonesian 
military continues to have a strong influence over the judiciary.5 Susanti (2001, p. 5) argues 
similarly that political lobbying was responsible for the non-retroactivity clause in the 
constitutional amendments regarding human rights a buses. Other examples include failed 
attempts to curb the money-making activities of the military. Although Law No. 34/2004 
banned the military from engaging in commercial activities and required the government to 
take over all military businesses by 2009, as of 2007 no action had been taken to implement it 
(Human Rights Watch, 2007). 
A quite different pattern is discernible in relation to labour rights. In the 1990s labour had 
been a frontline issue for the Indonesian pro-democracy movement as a whole, as well as 
attracting sustained support. After the fall of Suharto, it lost much of its prominence, giving 
way to campaigns on other issues, such as corruption. There was also a dramatic shift in the 
nature of international campaigning on labour issues. During the New Order, where it 
engaged at all, the international labour movement - with the exception of a small number of 
Trade Union Solidarity Support Organisations, most notably the American Center for 
International Labor Solidarity (ACILS)- was largely tied into working with the All-Indonesia 
Workers Federation (Federasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, FSPSI), the only trade 
union organisation permitted under the regime's one-union policy. However, substantial 
amounts of funding and other support flowed from government organisations - such as the 
Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation (Nederlandse 
Organisalie voor lnternationale Bijstand, NOVIB) as well as private organisations like the 
Ford Foundation - into labour organising via Indonesia's labour NGOs, alternative unions a 
and parts of the student movement. 
The dynamics of campaigns for labour rights altered markedly after the Habibie government 
recognised workers' freedom to organise. The international trade union movement began to 
engage intensively in Indonesia, investing heavily in the rebuilding of its large, industrially 
based trade unions (Caraway, 2004), while many of the international organisations that had 
previously supported the independent labour movement shifted their funding to other sectors. 
These shifts have had a dramatic effect on campaigns for labour rights. On the one hand, 
independent unions now have access to the tripartite mechanisms of the state and are better 
placed to lobby for members' rights at the local level. On the other hand, however, trade 
unions tend to focus primarily on a narrow band of work place related rights as they pertain 
to industrial workers rather than on the broad spectrum of labour and other rights that pertain 
to the working class, thus somewhat reducing the scope of labour rights campaigns. 
Finally, Reformasi has had a much less dramatic effect on campaigns for women's rights than 
either political rights or labour as the historical circumstances in this particular sector mean 
that there has not been as distinct a transformation. As noted earlier, gender issues were seen 
to be relatively politically neutral during the New Order period, when they also dovetailed 
with parts of the regime's agenda for economic development. and thus the women's rights 
agenda was relatively easy to promote. In the post-Suharto period. women 's rights continue 
to constitute an important part of the state's attempt to demonstrate its human rights 
credentials, as evidenced by the establishment of the National Commission on Violence 
Against Women (Komisi Nasional Anti-Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan, Komnas 
Perempuan), the rebranding in 1999 of the State Ministry for the Role of Women as the State 
Ministry for Women's Empowerment (Kementerian Negara Pemberdayaan Perempuan), and 
a series of gender mainstreaming initiatives as part of a whole-of-government approach.6 
In addition, the intensification of international engagement in other sectors has had an impact 
on the promotion of women's rights, as gender issues are now commonly integrated into a 
wide range of rights-based programs. At the same time, however, democratisation has given 
space to conservative political forces that have had a negative impact on the promotion of 
internationally recognised norms of gender equality (Budianta. 2006). Most notable among 
these are some Islamic groups who have lobbied for legal reform that restricts women's 
mobility and other aspects of their behaviour. Equally, however, in some regions ethnic 
movements fuelled by decentralisation have moved to encourage women to return to more 
traditional roles. 
Unpacking sectoral divergence 
How, then, can the quite different trajectories of these three relatively closely aligned rights 
fields be explained? At times, there have been direct synergies between different parts of the 
human rights movement. For example, during the 1990s the interests of feminist activists 
converged with the interests of labour activists, particularly after the murder of the worker-
activist Marsinah, a factory worker from the East Javanese town of Sidoarjo, who was 
brutalised by the military before her death and over the issue of female overseas contract 
labour (Ford. 2002; 2003). Similarly, feminist activists were particularly vocal in campaigns 
for the rights of Chinese women who suffered during the racially motivated violence of 1998 
and for female victims of ethnic and political violence across the archipelago in the years that 
followed (Budianta, 2003). However, the rapid decoupling of cross-sectoral coalitions, as 
occurred with the alliance between the women's movement and the labour movement in the 
post-Suharto period, suggests that such convergences are not structural, but rather contingent 
and incidental. 
Shifting alliances within a local human rights movement are sometimes influenced by the 
particular personalities involved. Under the New Order, much of the Indonesian human rights 
movement was brought together by an overarching concern with the need to achieve 
fundamental political change. an overarching concern that no longer exists. Always divided 
and very personalised, the activist community is now perhaps less focused than it has been at 
any time in recent history as a result of the broadening of scope for political expression, 
which has pushed activists in different directions. This has been coupled with a fracturing of 
the Left as power has become more accessible. Meanwhile, the remnants of the pro-
democracy movement have settled into middle age, as the generations of activists who 
struggled against the regime in the 1980s and 1990s enter their forties and fifties and are 
replaced by younger generations who do not have the same sense of political urgency. It is 
perhaps as a result of these factors that, as Eldridge (2005) suggests, while expressing broad 
support for universal human rights in their campaigns, a significant proportion of the many 
more NGOs established since 1998 focus primarily on social and economic activities rather 
than on human rights advocacy. 
However, divergence in the trajectories of different rights fields occurs at least in part 
because of the varied and changing agendas of the international rights movement itself. Risse 
and Sikkink (1999) argue that local advocacy for the international human rights agenda is 
made possible at least in part by support from the international rights community - an 
observation that is certainly true in Indonesia's case. A diverse range of international non-
governmental actors were highly influential in promoting the establishment of and supporting 
Indonesian human right groups during the New Order. These included not only international 
NGOs, but also churches. sector-specific interest groups such as the anti-sweatshop 
movement, and even individuals like Max Lane, the Australian patron of the PRD. Their 
interventions took myriad forms, from campaign support and capacity-building to the direct 
financing of NGOs and other civil society groups. Under the New Order, government 
controls on direct foreign intervention in matters of human rights, although not always 
successful, meant that funding of local organisations was the most prominent means of 
engagement within Indonesia. Foremost among these were the legal aid bureaux affiliated to 
the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bcmtuan Hukum Indonesia, 
YLBHI) - a key critic of human rights abuses and publisher of annual human rights reports 
from the early 1980s- which ran campaigns on a wide range of first and second generation 
rights issues as well as organising vulnerable groups as part of its structural legal aid program 
(see Aspinall, 2005). 
Today, as in the New Order period, more often than not changes in the focus of local human 
rights groups, and consequently in sectoral presence and alliances, reflect the agendas of 
those organisations' international allies, and in particular their donors. For example, the once-
powerful YLBHI is now greatly diminished, not only a result of internal fissures, but also the 
loss of much of its generous international funding. Importantly, the focus of international 
NGOs - and subsequently their Indonesian counterparts- is being increasingly constrained by 
the priorities of national aid agencies, which have always provided much of their funding, but 
are now imposing tighter guidelines on its use (Confidential Interviews. Singapore, 
November 2009). This is nowhere more obvious than in the tussle between AIDS prevention 
and anti-trafficking NGOs over programs involving sex workers after the US declared a ban 
on funding to any programs seen to be supporting prostitution (see Lyons and Ford, 2010), 
but it is also evident in many other sectors - for example, the growing emphasis in 
international programs on governance at the expense of programs promoting individual civil 
and political rights (Confidential Interviews, Jakarta, August 2009). 
As Herbert (2008. p. 479) has argued, local civil society organisations have played a 'pivotal 
role’ not only in advocacy for, but also the development of, the Indonesian human rights 
framework.7 All indications suggest that they will continue to do so with support from their 
international allies. At the same time, however, the United Nations institutions and bilateral 
aid donors now play an even more important role in promoting rights reform than they did 
during the New Order, having achieved far greater access to opportunities to engage in a 
substantive way with the bureaucracy and even the military than they had in the past. In the 
labour sphere, for instance, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has played a key role 
in the drafting of legislation that many in the labour movement felt was anti-worker (Boulton, 
2006). By contrast, the ILO regularly clashes with other international agencies over anti-
trafficking policy - in particular with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
which the ILO feels takes too narrow an approach to trafficking (Confidential Interviews, 
Geneva, April 2009). As these examples suggest, transformations in the local and 
international rights agenda are thus increasingly influenced by the changing and sector-
specific priorities of the United Nations agencies themselves, as well as in the priorities of the 
Indonesian government's key bilateral partners, all of which tend to be inherently more 
conservative than other international proponents of human rights change. 
It is apparent, too, that Indonesia 's status as a democratic country - however flawed that 
democracy may be - has made it difficult to maintain the same level of scrutiny of its human 
rights record. As Ron et at. (2005) have argued, even long-standing international NGOs with 
clearly defined areas of interest and independent funding sources like Amnesty International 
design their campaigns not just around the severity of human rights abuses but also around 
strategic opportunities to influence the international agenda. It is evident that with the 
exception of serious trouble spots, most notably Papua, the international emphasis on political 
and civil rights in Indonesia has significantly decreased as the attention of the international 
human rights movement shifts to less democratic nations. As under the New Order, there are 
significant differences in outcomes between different rights fields where a strong 
international lobby continues to exist. depending on the extent to which international 
concerns are taken up locally and on the political costs that acquiescence to international 
pressure for rights change impose upon the government of the day. This has been clearly 
demonstrated, for example, in the case of campaigns for the punishment of those involved in 
the military-sponsored violence in East Timor after the Referendum of 30 August 1999 
(Linton, 2004). 
In short, neither regime change nor increased access for the international rights community to 
Indonesia has resulted in the equal promotion of different human rights. According to much 
of the literature, this can be explained by problems faced in the transition to democracy, most 
importantly the ongoing influence of entrenched interest groups, combined with technical 
difficulties in the establishment and operation of particular human rights mechanisms at the 
national and sub-national levels. These factors are clearly both influential. However, as 
suggested here, sectoral unevenness in the trajectories of human rights change reflects not 
only local conditions but also the structures and contradictions of the international human 
rights lobby itself- a fact that has implications not only for our understanding of human rights 
change in Indonesia, but also for broader analyses or the power or transnational actors to 
effect human rights change and the efficacy of the international mechanisms through which 
change is promoted. 
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Notes 
1 The circumstances surrounding the coup and the mass killings that followed are still a matter of fierce 
scholarly and public debate. For a summary of the explanations offered for the coup, see Cribb (2002). 
2 Later Reformasi governments passed laws dealing with the rights of migrant workers and against human 
trafficking, reflecting the changing priorities of the international community. 
3 For more extensive overviews of the major human rights changes since Reformasi, see Eldridge (2002), 
Herbert (2008) and Juwana (2003). For an account of human rights in the New Order written at the height of 
keterbukaan, see Lubis (1993). For sector-specific accounts, sec Ballard (2001). Sari (2002) and Purdey (2008). 
4 Cardenas (2001) provides a detailed account of the politics surrounding the establishment of Komnas HAM. 
5 The desire of influential political figures within Timor Leste. and especially Ramos Horta and Xanana 
Gusmao. to establish a working relationship with Indonesia also helps to explain the international community's 
reluctance to push harder to bring the military and military-sponsored militias to justice for serious crimes 
committed in 1999 and during the Indonesian occupation. 
6 As True and Mintrom (2001) demonstrate, the spread of gender mainstreaming programs is by no means 
unique to Indonesia. 
7 But see Juwana (2003) for a less rosy picture of NGOs. particularly those that have been established in recent 
years to further the interests of corrupt officials. 
                                                          
